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Abstract
In the last two decades tariﬀs around the globe have fallen signiﬁcantly. However, less well known
are their changes in the sectorial structure of protection rates. Between 1988 and 1998, relative tariﬀs
have increased in capital-intensive sectors, and this shift is specially strong in low wage countries. These
changes in tariﬀ structures reﬂect the response of governments to increasing integration in product and
capital markets in the presence of international technology diﬀerences. Integration in factor markets
revives the concept of absolute advantage, and countries adjust their tariﬀ structure in order to compen-
sate for technology diﬀerences and cost pressures in order to keep a diversiﬁed production structure. As
a corollary, wage diﬀerences increase both within and between countries.
Key Words: Globalization, International Technology Diﬀerences, Tariﬀs.
JEL: F1, F20
∗I acknowledge the comments of Roberto Alvarez, Raphael Bergoeing and Peter Neary.
†Sebastian Claro (sclaro@faceapuc.cl) Instituto de Economia, Universidad Catolica de Chile, Casilla 76, Correo 17, Santiago
- Chile. Phone (56 2) 354 4325 Fax (56 2) 553 2377.
1Globalization is usually viewed as a process of increasing integration in world product markets. Indeed,
a huge rise in international trade in goods and services has been observed in the last 40 years, and openness
to world product markets in many countries around the globe is one of the more salient features of the world
trading system.1 The rise in world trade has been accompanied with important changes in factor markets,
mainly the rise in wage dispersion across skill groups within developed and developing countries, and the
shift toward more capital-intensive production processes (Desjonqueres et.al., (1999)). Traditional trade
models have been used to analyze the impact of globalization on factor markets, and their success has been
limited because they cannot explain the rise in capital(human and physical)-labor ratios together with a rise
in the relative price of skilled labor.
Although new channels through which globalization aﬀect factor markets have been developed, like
outsourcing (see Feenstra and Hanson (1997)), the most common explanation for these outcomes continues
to be technological change, more speciﬁcally, labor-saving technological change. According to Treﬂer and Zhu
(2001), some form of factor-bias technological change is needed to make consistent a trade-based explanation
with the change in skill-intensities across most sectors. However, as Neary has pointed out (2002a, b), in a
multisector world technology change has to be factor-biased and sector-biased to account for the empirical
regularities already mentioned, and the evidence on this is scarce. Therefore, he argues in favor of factor-
markets’ eﬀects of global integration in imperfectly competitive models.
This paper presents an alternative look at the globalization and technology debate by looking at the
evolution of tariﬀs since mid 1980s across developed and developing countries. Over the last two decades,
tariﬀs have shifted toward protecting more capital-intensive sectors, and this bias is stronger in low-wage
countries. The paper argues that the evolution of tariﬀs provides a novel way to determine the mechanisms
through which global integration aﬀects diﬀerent countries. For that, two modiﬁcations of traditional trade
models are required, one formal and the other conceptual. First, to understand the eﬀect of globalization
on factor markets we must focus on the determinants of international factor price diﬀerences. I work on the
1As percentage of GDP, exports plus imports have risen from around 23% in 1973 to about 28% in 1992. These number
compare to a 21% ratio in 1913, the peak of global trade in the whole period before the 1970s. See Estevadeordal et.al., (2003).
2basis on international technology diﬀerences. Second, we must recognize that global integration is not only
about product market integration. It is also about factor market integration.2
These two variations are relevant for several reasons. Traditional trade models project factor price
equalization as a result of product market integration if technologies are similar across countries and factor
endowments are not too dissimilar. In this case, the zero proﬁt conditions in viable sectors are the same,
and so are factor prices. Thereby, product price equalization leads to factor price equalization. However,
diﬀerences in factor prices are signiﬁcant and persistent over time. The existence of technology diﬀerences
may be crucial to understand this. In a model with internationally immobile factors of production, diﬀerences
in technology are compensated with diﬀerences in factor prices. This is the relevant channel through
which native industries keep a competitive position in world markets. This is indeed the mechanism that
makes comparative advantage rather than absolute advantage the key concept in international specialization.
After product price distortions have been removed, world factor prices are fully dominated by international
technology diﬀerences.
However, the mechanism described above is seriously limited if globalization is also a process of increasing
integration in factor markets. With international factor mobility, factor prices in countries with backward
technologies cannot adjust to compensate for the technological diﬀerences, as they can obtain a greater
return in high-technology countries. Therefore, the concept of absolute advantage is revived, as absolute
technology diﬀerences imply factor price diﬀerences that are not sustainable over time. Countries can either
see their factors migrate or they can introduce distortions in product and factor markets to sustain their
native industry. These interventions may not be optimal from a welfare point of view, but I argue they
adequately reﬂect the response of countries to global integration.
In particular, the paper emphasizes the role of interventions in product markets, namely tariﬀs, in
sustaining domestic industries. I argue that the evolution of tariﬀsi nt h el a s tﬁfteen years can be understood
as the response of governments to increasing integration in product markets, measured as a fall in average
tariﬀs, and to increasing integration in capital markets, measured as convergence in the return to capital
2See Jones (2000).
3across countries. In both scenarios, capital-intensive sectors face greater cost pressures, and a shift in
protection in their favor is required to sustain them. As a corollary, increases in wage inequality within
countries follow. Moreover, international wage divergence rather than international wage convergence is the
more likely outcome of globalization.
Finally, this mechanism do not account for the observed changes in the factor-intensities of production
processes. In that sense, as Treﬂer and Zhu (2001) point out, some form of technological change is required.
However, I argue that labor-saving technology changes are a partial explanation, for they can account for
the changes in tariﬀ structures and international wage diﬀerences under very special circumstances.
The paper is divided as follows. Next section presents the evidence on the structure and evolution of
tariﬀs for a cross-section of developed and developing countries between 1988 and 1998. Section 2 presents a
simple general equilibrium model to explain the tariﬀ structure consistent with the production of all sectors
in the economy under the assumption of international technology diﬀerences and some degree of integration
in factor markets. I discuss the impact of product market integration, capital market integration, terms-of-
trade changes and technology changes in the evolution of tariﬀs. Section 2 also presents empirical evidence
on the evolution of international wage diﬀerences. Section 3 concludes.
1 The Evolution of Tariﬀs
Tariﬀs have fallen signiﬁcantly in the last two decades. However, these changes in average tariﬀsh a v e
been accompanied with important changes in the structure of tariﬀs. This section provides evidence on
the changes in relative sectorial tariﬀs for a cross-section of developed and developing countries between
1988 and 1998. For that, I use the Trade and Production Database from Nicita and Olarreaga (2001) that
contains data on production, employment, labor payments and tariﬀs between 1976 and 1999 for 67 countries
at the 3-digit ISIC manufacturing classiﬁcation. However, the requirement of sectorial estimates of factor
intensities, wages and tariﬀs for at least two years shrinks signiﬁcantly the availability of data.3.
3See the Appendix for details and dimensions of the Database.
4At any point in time, tariﬀs across countries can vary in two dimensions. First, average tariﬀsm a yb e
diﬀerent. Second, the sectorial distribution of tariﬀs across sectors may also diﬀer across countries. More
speciﬁcally, I focus on whether there exists a signiﬁcant association between tariﬀs and factor-intensities, and
on whether this relationship varies across countries with diﬀerent income or wage levels. The introduction
of a time dimension to the analysis increases the scope of changes in the tariﬀ structure. Over time, average
tariﬀs can change, the distribution of tariﬀs can change, and these changes may diﬀer across countries with
diﬀerent wage levels. I therefore consider the following empirical speciﬁcation
τc
it = α1c + α2cTt + β1 (L/K)
c
it + β2 (L/K)
c
it Tt + γ1 (L/K)
c
it wc





it represents the tariﬀ rate in industry i of country c in year t. (L/K) represent the labor-capital
ratio, Tt is a trend variable and wc
t is the average wage level of country c in year t.C o n s i d e r ﬁrst the case
when α2c = β2 = γ2 =0 .T h e c o e ﬃcient β1 measures whether the tariﬀ structure diﬀers across sectors
with diﬀerent capital-labor ratios, and the country-speciﬁc α1c intercept reﬂects diﬀerences in average tariﬀs.
The coeﬃcient γ1 allows for diﬀerences in the sectorial bias of tariﬀsa c r o s sc o u n t r i e sw i t hd i ﬀerent average
wage levels. Consider now changes over time in tariﬀs. The coeﬃcients α2c and β2 reﬂect changes in
average tariﬀs and its sectorial distribution, and γ2 6=0reveals changes in the sectorial distribution of tariﬀs
across countries with diﬀerent wage levels.
[Insert Table 1]
Tables 1 and 2 report the results of alternative speciﬁcations using 3-digit ISIC manufacturing data for
29 countries between 1988 and 1998. All panel regressions use country-speciﬁc ﬁxed-eﬀects. In table 1,
labor-intensity (L/K)
c
it is measured as the labor share in value-added, θ
c
Li.T h e ﬁrst two columns consider
γ1 = γ2 =0 . Tariﬀs are greater in labor-intensive sectors. However, this bias have decreased over time.
These results are not dominated by outliers, as the exclusion of data point with tariﬀ level greater than 200%
(8 observations) reveal. The last two columns allow for diﬀerences in the tariﬀ structure across countries
with diﬀerent wage levels. Excluding data points with tariﬀs greater than 200%, it is clear that tariﬀs
tend to be greater in labor-intensive sectors, specially in low-wage countries. Over time, protection to
5labor-intensive sectors have decreased, and this shift is more important in low-wage countries.
[Insert Table 2]
These regressions are subject to two endogeneity problems. First, tariﬀsm a ya ﬀect wages. However,
this might be relevant for sector-speciﬁc wages but not for average manufacturing wages. If no sector is
big enough to aﬀect signiﬁcantly the labor market, wc does not depend on τc
i. Second, labor-share in
value-added may be aﬀected by the level of the tariﬀ in each sector, meaning that θ
c
Li is not a good proxy
of the labor-capital ratio. Therefore, I consider (θL/θK)
c
i as an alternative measure for (L/K)
c
i.T h e





i. As long as relative factor prices are similar
across sectors ((w/r)c
i ≈ (w/r)c), θL/θK is a good proxy of factor intensity. Moreover, even if sectorial
tariﬀsa ﬀect sector-speciﬁcf a c t o rp r i c e s ,θL/θK does not depend on τ as long as the tariﬀ rate does not alter
relative factor prices. The regression results reported in table 2 show similar patterns as those obtained in
table 1. Tariﬀs tend to be greater in labor-intensive sectors, specially in low-wage countries. However, over
time tariﬀs have shifted toward capital-intensive sectors, specially in low-wage countries.4
2M o d e l
2.1 Endogenous Factor Prices
Consider an economy with two sectors of production and perfectly competitive product and factor markets.
Sector x is assumed to be the capital-intensive industry. Technologies are assumed of ﬁxed proportions and
with constant-return-to-scale.5 Production factors, labor (L) and capital (K), are internationally immobile,
so their returns are endogenously determined. Product prices are set internationally, although tariﬀsm a y
distort them. The zero proﬁt condition for sector i is given by
pw
i (1 + τi)=aLiw + aKir (1)
4The results are not aﬀected if we use relative average country wages (wc/w∗) rather than average dollar country wages.
Neither the results are aﬀected if the United States is excluded from the speciﬁcation. The rationale for this is discussed below.
5The Leontief assumption helps to simplify the algebra and it does not alter the results.
6where pw
i is the world price of product i = x,y; τi is the tariﬀ level in industry i, aFi is the requirement
of factor F = L,K to produce one unit of good i (the inverse of average productivity), and w and r are the
returns per unit of labor and capital respectively. The solution to the system of equations implicit in (1) is a
vector of wage and rental rate consistent with production in both sectors. The well-known graphical solution
to this problem is the Lerner-Pierce diagram depicted in ﬁgure 1, that shows the unit-value isoquants for
both sectors. As long as relative factor endowments are not extreme, w0 and r0 are the only wage and
rental rate levels consistent with production eﬃciency and zero proﬁt conditions in both sectors.
[Insert Figure 1]
With internationally immobile production factors, their returns depend on technologies, world prod-
uct prices and tariﬀs. The ﬁrst two are exogenously determined, while tariﬀs are a policy choice of the
government.
Consider also that there exist technological diﬀerences between the home country and a foreign country




and aKi =( 1+δ
K
i )a∗




i greater than zero imply that average labor and capital productivity




i = δi,w e
can rewrite (1) as
pw
i (1 + τi)=( 1+δi)(a∗
Liw + a∗
Kir). (2)
Combining (2) with the zero-proﬁt conditions in the foreign country (pw




get an expression for the ratio of home to foreign wages as a function of home and foreign tariﬀs( τi and
τ∗
i), technology diﬀerences δi and the level of foreign technologies (a∗
Li and a∗
Ki).
2.2 Exogenous Factor Prices
Imagine now that this country were integrated at the factor-market level with the rest of the world. Inter-
national diﬀerences in the opportunity costs of factors push for wage and rental rate equalization. However,
I consider that factor price equalization is not complete due to distortions or costs associated with moving
7factors.
In particular, consider that the return to factor F in the home country can be written as pf = λFp∗
f
where pf is the return to factor F in the native economy as a proportion of the return in the rest of the
world p∗
f. λF measures the degree of factor markets’ integration. I assume that the international return
to capital and labor are set in the foreign country, that is big enough to determine w∗ and r∗. Therefore,
w = λLw∗ and r = λKr∗.6 With this notation we can rewrite the zero proﬁt conditions for each sector i in
the home country as
pw
i (1 + τi)=( 1+δi)(a∗
LiλLw∗ + a∗
KiλKr∗) (3)
where δi is the hicks-neutral technology gap in sector i. Given values for λL, λF and international world
prices, nothing assures that both zero proﬁt conditions hold with the initial tariﬀ structure. Hence, I assume
that tariﬀs adjust such that both zero-proﬁt conditions hold. The tariﬀ structure consistent with equation
(3) is

























Consider for the sake of the argument that both τ∗
x and τ∗
y are equal to zero. The structure of protection
depends on two forces. The ﬁrst one is related to the distribution of international technology diﬀerences.
Factor market integration rises factor prices in a country with backward technologies. And this increase in
greater for the factor used intensively in the industry with greater technology diﬀerence. Therefore, greater
protection is required in more backward sectors. Tariﬀs are the compensating mechanism to support
industries with international real cost pressures.
The second determinant of the tariﬀ structure is related to the eﬀects of uneven factor markets’ inte-
gration. The greater the integration in capital markets relative to labor markets (λK/λL), the greater
the cost pressures on capital-intensive sectors. Therefore, more protection is required for these industries.
Indeed, the derivative of the right-hand-side of (4) with respect to λK/λL is positive if and only if sector x
is the capital-intensive sector, revealing that increases in capital-market integration relative to labor-market
integration generate greater cost pressures in capital-intensive sectors, shifting the tariﬀ structure in their
6λL ∈ [w0/w∗,1] if w0 <w ∗ and λL ∈ [1,w 0/w∗] if w0 >w ∗. Similar for λK.
8beneﬁt. On the other hand, if λK = λL,t h e n(1+τx)/(1+τy)=( 1+δx)/(1+δy) and tariﬀs are completely
determined by international technology diﬀerences. The ﬁnal tariﬀ structure will depend on the strength



































Figure 2 plots (1 + τx)/(1 + τy) against λK/λL implicit in (4).7 If cross-industry diﬀerences in δs are
big enough, and dominate diﬀerences in factor intensities, protection remains greater in the labor-intensive
sector even with greater integration in capital markets.
[Insert Figure 2]
Removing the assumption that foreign tariﬀs are zero introduces a third element in the determination
of domestic tariﬀs. In this case, disadvantages of domestic ﬁrms compared to foreign ones exist the tariﬀs
receives by foreign ﬁrms that alter the equilibrium levels of w∗ and r∗. Therefore, greater foreign protection
in the capital-intensive sector generates upward pressures on r∗. This requires greater domestic protection
in sector x.
The implications of the model are twofold. First, the structure of tariﬀs with integrated factor-markets
is aﬀected by the distribution of technology diﬀerences, the degree of labor and capital markets’ integration
and the tariﬀ structure in the foreign country. Second, for a given level of technology diﬀerences, increases in
capital market integration relative to labor market integration generates a shift in protection toward capital-
intensive sectors. This last prediction coincides with the evidence presented in section 1. If globalization
i nt h el a s td e c a d e si ss e e na sap r o c e s so fg r e a t er integration in capital markets (rise in λK), a shift in
protection in favor of capital-intensive sectors follows if countries set their tariﬀs in order to keep a fully-
diversiﬁed production structure.8
7In ﬁgure 2 D =( 1+δx)/(1 + δy).
8See Rodrik (1997) for a discussion of diﬀerent degrees of international integration in capital (human and physical) markets
9However, the scope of the model is seriously limited by three forces. First, the eﬀect of changes in λK/λL
in relative tariﬀs does not vary across countries with diﬀerent (average) technology gaps. Second, equation
(3) determines not only relative tariﬀs but also their absolute levels. Third, and more important, the level
and evolution of wages is fully determined by the parameter λL. This is an extreme assumption, specially
because integration in labor markets, specially in low-skilled labor, is rather small (or null) compared to
integration in capital or high-skilled labor markets. Therefore, I introduce in the model the possibility of
endogenously determined wages by assuming that international integration exists only in capital (physical
or human) markets.
2.3 Endogenous Wages
Consider now that only capital market are integrated internationally, while labor is immobile across borders.
As before, the return to capital domestically is given by λKr∗. The set of zero-proﬁt conditions in each
sector in the home country becomes
pw
i (1 + τi)=( 1+δi)(a∗
Liw + a∗
KiλKr∗). (5)
With exogenously determined λK,t h e r ea r ei n ﬁnite combinations of τx,τ y and w that satisfy (5) for
sectors x and y. Therefore, to uniquely determine the equilibrium tariﬀs and wage level, I consider that the
level of average tariﬀs is a policy variable that is exogenously determined. The reader can think of this as
a measure of unilateral product market integration. Hence,
γx(1 + τx)+γy(1 + τy)=τ. (6)
The solution to these three equations (the two in (5) and (6)) is a vector of τx,τy and w con-
sistent with production in both sectors as a function of a∗
Li,a ∗













x − (1 + δx)γxrA
(7)
versus labor markets.




Ky > 0 under the assumption that x is the capital-intensive sector. Equation
(7) takes r∗ as given for any country. Solving for r∗, that is endogenously determined in the foreign country,










Lyτp− (1 + δx)γxλKB
(8)
where p = pw
x/pw




y) > 0. T h i si saf u n d a m e n t a le x p r e s s i o ni nt h e
paper. It states the determinants of the tariﬀ structure as function of policy variables (τ,λK), international
technology diﬀerences (δi), relative product prices (p) and the determinants of the international cost of
capital (r∗). We can now discuss the impact of changes in these exogenous variables on 1+τx/1+τy.I n
particular, we focus on the impact of a fall in average tariﬀs τ, a change in the degree of capital markets’
integration λK, changes in relative product prices p, and technological changes.
2.3.1 Product Market Integration
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of a fall in average tariﬀs. It is possible to show that ∂(1+τx/1+τy)/∂τ<0.A f a l l
in average tariﬀs imply a rise in relative protection to the capital-intensive. The intuition is the following.
If both tariﬀs were to fall in the same proportion9, both zero-proﬁt conditions cannot hold simultaneously
because the cost of capital does not adjust. The required adjustment in wages in the labor-intensive sector
y leaves sector x non-competitive. Therefore, a rise in its relative tariﬀ is required to compensate for the
greater relative cost of capital.
Not only the tariﬀ structure changes with the fall in τ but the shift in favor of the capital-intensive sector
is greater in low-wage countries. Consider for simplicity that δx = δy = δ.10 Countries with high δ have
low wages, ceteris paribus. In such case, ∂2(1 + τx/1+τy)/∂τ∂(1 + δ) < 0, revealing that the eﬀect on
9Strictly speaking, a similar fall in tariﬀsm e a n st h a t \ (1 + τx)= \ (1 + τy).
10It is possible that international wage diﬀerences are not only related to the level of technology diﬀerences but also to its
sectorial distribution. In Claro (2003b), I ﬁnd evidence that the dispersion of technology diﬀerences across sectors is very
small compared to cross-country diﬀerences in technologies, suggesting that international wage diﬀerences are mainly aﬀected
by average levels of technology diﬀerences. See also Treﬂer (1993) for the role of technology diﬀerences explaining international
wage diﬀerences.
11the tariﬀ structure is greater in low-wage countries. The reason is that the cost disadvantage of capital-
intensive sectors relative to the labor-intensive sector is increasing in the level of technology gap, even in the
case where technology diﬀerences are the same across sectors. This is because the relative cost of capital
domestically is increasing on the average technology gap. In summary, the empirical results described in
section 1 are compatible with a process of continuous fall in average tariﬀsa c r o s sc o u n t r i e si nt h ep r e s e n c e
of international technology diﬀerences and some degree of capital markets’ integration.
The fall in average tariﬀs have also important implications for factor prices. Solving for international









































The partial derivative of (9) with respect to τ is positive, showing that a fall in average tariﬀs generate
a rise in international wage diﬀerences. A fall in average tariﬀs generate downward pressures on native
wages for two reasons. First, there is a fall in nominal wages accompanying the fall in nominal product
prices. This is of course a trivial and uninteresting eﬀect. However, the fall in average tariﬀsi m p l ya
shift in protection toward the capital-intensive sector, beneﬁting the factor used intensively in that industry.
Moreover, ∂2(w/w∗)/∂τ∂(1 + δ) < 0, revealing that a similar fall in average tariﬀs generate a greater fall
in international relative wages in poor or low-wage countries. This is an important result because even if
globalization is a process of worldwide fall in average tariﬀs, a rise in international wage diﬀerences should
be observed.
This is exactly what ﬁgure 3 shows. It plots the ratio of average manufacturing wages per worker
between 43 countries and the United States in 1980 and 1995. There is a positive and signiﬁcant association
between both series, and the slope of .695 (st.error: .055) is signiﬁcantly lower than the depicted 45o line,
revealing that low-wage countries have fallen behind high-wage countries, on average. Only Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Cyprus have been able to catch-up. This result is consistent with the evidence
12presented in Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) regarding the evolution of international wage diﬀerences. Using
a comprehensive database from ILO, they show that cross-country diﬀerences in pay for comparable work
have increased since mid 1980s.
[Insert Figure 3]
A more systematic exercise is performed by estimating the following panel regression between 1977 and
1998
(wc/w∗)it = α0c + α1 · Tt + α2 · (Tt · (wc/w∗)i1976)+εit
where (wc/w∗)it is the ratio of average wage rates between country c and the United States in industry
i in year t,a n dTt is a trend variable. The speciﬁcation allows for cross-industry diﬀerences in interna-
tional relative wages. The interactive term α2 measures whether the trend variable varies across countries
with diﬀerent wage ratios in 1976. The results of the regression using country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀe c t si st h e
following11
(wc/w∗)it = .00368 · Tt + .000399 · (Tt · (wc/w∗)i1976)
(26.96) (73.71)
The overall R2 is .75. The positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the interactive term reveals that
increases in international wage diﬀerences have occurred, consistent with ﬁgure 3.
Finally, the partial derivative of equation (10) with respect to τ is positive. This implies that a fall
in average wages generate a fall in the relative price of the internationally-immobile factor. Generalizing
the model to consider that the internationally mobile factor is human or physical capital and the immobile
factor is unskilled labor, this result can be interpreted as an increase in wage diﬀerences between skilled and
unskilled workers within countries. The shift in tariﬀs in favor of the capital-intensive sector beneﬁts the
factor used intensively in that industry.
11Test z in parenthesis.
132.3.2 Capital Markets’ Integration
Alternatively, we can think of globalization as a process of increasing integration in international capital
markets. From the perspective of developing countries, this implies a rise in λK. It is possible to show that
∂(1+τx/1+τy)/∂λK > 0, revealing that a rise in capital market integration generates a shift in protection
in favor of the capital-intensive sector. The increase in the cost of capital rises marginal costs more in
the capital-intensive industry, with the consequent increase in protection. Assuming again that technology
diﬀerences are similar across sectors, ∂2(1 + τx/1+τy)/∂λK∂(1 + δ) > 0. For similar increases in the cost
of capital, the shift in protection toward the capital-intensive industry is greater in low-wage countries.12
This is consistent with the evidence presented in section 1.
Regarding the impact of changes in λK on international wage diﬀerences between and within countries, it
is possible to show that ∂(w/w∗)/∂λK < 0 and ∂(w/r)/∂λK < 0.T h e ﬁrst inequality reveals that an increase
in capital markets’ integration implies a rise in international wage diﬀerences. This is because the rise in the
cost of capital generates a fall in domestic wages, consistent with the rise in protection in the capital-intensive
sector x. Likewise, within-country wage diﬀerentials increase. These eﬀects are not dependent on the level
of technology diﬀerences of countries, as ∂2(w/w∗)/∂λK∂(1 + δ)=∂2(w/r)/∂λK∂(1 + δ)=0 .
2.3.3 Changes in Relative Product Prices
Changes in relative product prices p have two eﬀects on the tariﬀ structure. On the one hand, a fall in the
relative price of the labor-intensive good (increase in p) generates a rise in the degree of protection required for
that industry. This is the direct eﬀect associated with changes in p when the return to capital is exogenously
determined. On the other hand, changes in product prices aﬀect the equilibrium in the foreign country,
where r∗ is determined. At given foreign tariﬀs τ∗, a fall in the relative price of the labor-intensive good
generates a rise in foreign return to capital r∗,a ﬀecting negatively the domestic capital-intensive industry.
12This result is valid because the wage fall required to compensate a rise in the cost of capital is greater in countries with
worse technologies, as θK/θL is lower in poor countries. However, this is only valid as long as the elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital, σ,i ss m a l l e rt h a n1 . T h i si st h ec a s ei nt h ep a p e ra sσ =0 .







x)γx((1 + δx)λK − 1) + (1 + τ∗
y)γy((1 + δy)λK − 1)
¤
(11)
with K>0. To simplify the analysis, consider again that δx = δy = δ. Expression (11) becomes
positive as long as (1 + δ)λK > 1. This is not an obvious condition, as (1 + δ) is greater than one but λK
is smaller than one for the typical developing country. If δs are eﬀectively evenly distributed across sectors,
its impact on domestic factor prices w and r is also evenly distributed. However, r = λKr∗. Therefore,
observing relative factor price ratios (w/r)/(w∗/r∗) can shed light on the size of (1 + δ)λK. For example,
if (w/r)/(w∗/r∗) > 1 it suggests that (1 + δ)λK < 1.
An alternative reaction of the foreign country is to adjust its tariﬀ structure in order to keep the inter-
national return to capital constant. In this case, as evident from equation (9), a rise in p generates a shift
in protection in favor of the labor-intensive good. If globalization is seen as a period of reacommodating
relative product prices13, no clear pattern for the structure of protection across countries is suggested by the
model. The results not only depend on the strength on the technology gap and the degree of capital market
integration, but also on the response of the foreign country to the relative price change.
The impact on international wage diﬀerences is not clear either. If r∗ a b s o r b sa l lt h er i s ei np,t h e r ei sa
fall in w∗. T h er i s ei nr∗ also aﬀects negatively the domestic wage rate, and nothing can be said regarding
w/w∗. L i k e w i s ef o rt h ec a s ew h e r ef o r e i g nt a r i ﬀs are adjusted in order to keep the foreign return to capital
constant.
2.3.4 Technological change
One of the main features of factor markets in the last decades is related to the increase in the capital (physical
and human) intensity of production processes, both in developed and developing countries. This is not a
trivial eﬀect considering that the relative price of unskilled labor have fallen in the same period. Traditional
13Leamer (1998) has shown that the 1970s was a decade of a signiﬁcant fall in the relative price of labor-intensive manufacturing
goods. Thereafter no signiﬁcant pattern of relative product price changes has been documented.
15trade channels like Stolper-Samuelson and outsourcing (Feenstra and Hanson (1996)) or the ones discussed
in this paper are able to account for the evolution of the evolution of relative factor prices and tariﬀs, but
they cannot account for the changes in factor intensities. Technological changes can do so. Speciﬁcally,
labor-saving technological change may explain the fall in relative wages of unskilled labor and the rise in
the skill-intensity of production processes. However, is labor-saving technological change able to explain
the changes in tariﬀ structures and the rise in international wage diﬀerences? The next lines are aimed to
answer this question.
To focus the discussion I study the eﬀect of labor-saving technological change keeping constant the
hicks-neutral technological diﬀerences across countries in each industry. In other words, I consider that
technological changes are multilateral.14 Regarding the eﬀects of technological changes on the foreign
country, I assume that tariﬀs do not adjust and that all the eﬀect is absorbed by factor prices. This is to
be consistent with the changes in relative factor prices associated with technology changes.
Consider ﬁrst the case when technological changes are symmetric across countries and across industries.
In terms of the model, c aLi = c a∗
Li = −ρL < 0 and d aKi = d a∗
Ki = −ρK < 0 for i = x,y. It is possible to
show that c w∗ = ρL and b r∗ = ρK. Contrary to the eﬀect in a one-sector economy, a fall in w∗/r∗ results
from capital-saving technological change (ρK >ρ L) rather than labor-saving technological change. This
is because in a two-sector model a labor-saving symmetric technological change favors the labor-intensive
industry (see Neary (2002a)). Therefore, the labor-saving technological change required to generate an
increase in the capital-labor ratio in the production processes is not consistent with the fall in the ratio of
unskilled to skilled (or capital) factor prices. This leads Neary to reject a technology-based explanation for
the rise in wage inequality in rich and poor countries.
However, if labor-saving technology change is also sector-biased, favoring the capital-intensive sector, the
rise in wage diﬀerences within countries is compatible with the increase in skill intensities.15 Indeed, the
14Berman and Machin (2000) present evidence that technology changes have occurred in developed and developing countries
alike.
15See Haskel and Slaughter (2002) for evidence on this.












Ly, that is, multifactor productivity growth
is greater in the capital-intensive sector. Notice that if technological change is symmetric across countries
and sectors as stated in last pharagraph, this condition is not satisﬁed. Therefore, we focus on technological
changes that satisfy two conditions: a) multifactor productivity growth is greater in the capital-intensive
sector and b) technological change is labor-saving: c a∗
Li > d a∗
Ki for i = x,y.
The derivative of relative tariﬀs in equation (8) to technological changes is given by

















with Z>0. Neither of the bracket terms in the right-hand-side can be signed. Consider the ﬁrst term,
and assume for simplicity of exposition that technological diﬀerences are similar across sectors. The term
can be written as τ − λK(1 + δ)τ∗,w h e r eτ∗ is the average tariﬀ factor computed using domestic weights.
Even if average protection is similar across countries, the sign depends on whether λK(1 + δ) ≷ 1.T h i s
condition is the same as the one relevant to determine the eﬀect of relative product price changes, and the
same discussion applies. The second term in brackets cannot be signed either. Given the restrictions
imposed to the form of technological change, nothing can be said with respect to d a∗
Lx − d a∗
Ly. However,
the most likely sign for d a∗
Lx − d a∗
Ly is negative.16 In this case, tariﬀs will shift toward greater protection in
capital-intensive sectors if τ − λK(1 + δ)τ∗ < 0, that implies λK(1 + δ) > τ/τ∗. Given that average tariﬀs
are usually greater in low-wage countries, this is not a very likely condition.
Therefore, nothing conclusive can be said regarding the impact of technological changes on relative tariﬀs
without an empirical estimation of τ −λK(1+δ)τ∗ and d a∗
Lx−d a∗
Ly. Similar conditions hold to determine the
eﬀect of labor-saving technological changes on international wage diﬀerences. Hence, it is not very likely
(although it is possible) that technological changes are behind this changes in tariﬀs and international wage
diﬀerences.

















Ly. Considering that θ∗
Kx >θ ∗
Ky, d a∗
Lx − d a∗
Ly < 0 unless the bias of the technological change
in the labor-intensive sector is much greater than the bias of the technological change in the capital-intensive sector
³
d a∗
Ky − d a∗
Ly > d a∗




173C o n c l u s i o n
The diminished capacity of traditional trade models to explain the main facts of international labor markets
have left economists in an uncomfortable position. Some economists have pushed in favor of imperfect
competitive models with broader transmission mechanisms into factor markets. I follow an alternative
route. In a perfectly competitive setting, the paper argues that integration in product and factor markets
in the presence of international technology diﬀerences revives the concept of absolute advantage. In this
setting, countries respond by adjusting their tariﬀ structures in order to avoid important factor reallocation
and to defend some industries. This reaction is not optimal from a welfare point of view, but I argue it
reﬂects adequately the response of governments to global competition.
The paper shows that the evolution of tariﬀ structures can help to understand the role of globalization
in factor markets. The shift in protection toward capital-intensive sectors in the last 15 years, specially in
low-wage countries, is consistent with increasing integration in product and capital markets. As a corollary,
increases in international wage diﬀerences are expected, as well as increases in wage diﬀerences within
countries. The eﬀect on relative tariﬀs of multilateral labor-saving technology is ambiguous and depends
on the intensity of the technology change, the size and dispersion of technology diﬀerences, and diﬀerences
in average tariﬀs between each country and the United States. This is clearly an area were further work is
needed.
18Appendix
The data corresponds to the data base organized by Alessandro Nicita and Marcelo Olarreaga of World
Bank.17 It contains data on industrial production, tariﬀsa n dt r a d eﬂows. Industrial statistics are obtained
from UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics Database that contains data at the 3-digit ISIC manufacturing codes
on output, value added, wages and salaries, employment and gross ﬁxed capital formation. Trade data are
from United Nations Statistics Department’s Comtrade database. Tariﬀ’s statistics are from UNCTAD’s
Trains database.
[Insert Table Appendix]
17N i c i t a ,Aa n dM .O l a r r e a g a( 2 0 0 1 ) .
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21Table 1
Evolution of Tariff Structure - 3-digit ISIC
Factor Intensity measured labor share in value-added
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable τ ic τ ic τ ic τ ic
θ Lic 7945,01 2653,45 6689,45 2964,21
1545,36 917,15 1696,28 998,13
θ Lic * time -3,99 -1,33 -3,35 -1,48
0,78 0,46 0,85 0,50
θ Lic * wc 29,78 -170,37
108,14 63,64
θ Lic * wc * time -0,02 0,09
0,05 0,03
R-Squared Overall 0,16 0,27 0,16 0,21
Number of Observations 3377 3369 3377 3369
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29
Data Restrictions none t<200 none t<200
<3 years no JAP, USA
Standard Errors in Italics
t ic : Tariff level (*100) in industry i in country c
θ Lic : Labor share in value-added
wc : Average wage in country cTable 2
Evolution of Tariff Structure - 3-digit ISIC
Factor Intensity measured as relative factor usage (L/K*w/r)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable τ ic τ ic τ ic τ ic
L/K ic 746,27 568,92 960,80 917,33
267,63 157,84 344,56 202,67
L/K ic * time -0,37 -0,28 -0,48 -0,46
0,13 0,08 0,17 0,10
L/K ic * wc -50,93 -64,37
29,52 17,37
L/K ic * wc * time 0,03 0,03
0,01 0,01
R-Squared Overall 0,15 0,26 0,13 0,21
Number of Observations 3377 3369 3377 3369
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29
Data Restrictions none t<200 none t<200
<3 years no JAP, USA
Standard Errors in Italics
t ic : Tariff level (*100) in industry i in country c
L/K ic : θ Lic / (1 - θ Lic)
wc : Average wage in country cTable Appendix
Data Availability and Database Dimensions
3-digit data
# Code Country τ θ L w Data Available
1 BOL Bolivia 93-98 88-98 88-98 93-98
2 CAN Canada 89,93,95-98 88-98 88-98 89,93,95-98
3 CHL Chile 92-95,97-98 88-98 88-98 92-95,97-98
4 CMR Cameroon 94-95 89-97 89-97 94-95
5 COL Colombia 91-92,94-97 88-98 88-98 91-92,94-97
6 ECU Ecuador 93-98 88-97 88-97 93-97
7 HKG Hong Kong 88,98 88-98 88-98 88-97
8 HUN Hungary 91,93,96-97 88-98 88-98 91,93,96-97
9 IDN Indonesia 89-90,93,95-96 88-97 88-97 89-90,93,95-96
10 IND India 90,92,97 88-98 88-98 90,92,97
11 JPN Japan 88-98 88-98 88-98 88-98
12 KOR South Korea 88-90,92,95-96 88-97 88-97 88-90,92,95-96
13 LKA Sri Lanka 90,93-94,97 88-95 88-95 90,93-94
14 MAR Morocco 93,97 88-97 88-97 93-97
15 MEX Mexico 91,95,97-98 88-98 88-98 91,95,97-98
16 MYS Malaysia 88,91,93,96-97 88-98 88-98 88,91,93,96-97
17 NOR Norway 88,93,95-96,98 88-98 88-98 88,93,95-96,98
18 NZL New Zealand 92-93,96-98 88-96 88-97 92-93,96
19 PHL Philippines 88-90,92-95,98 88-97 88-97 88-90,92-95
20 POL Poland 91-92,95-96 88-98 88-98 91-92,95-96
21 SGP Singapore 89,95 88-97 88-97 89,95
22 THA Thailand 89,91,93,95 88-91,93-94 88-91,93-94 89,91,93
23 TTO Trinidad Tobago 91-92,96 88-95 88-95 91-92
24 TUR Turkey 93,95,97 88-98 88-98 93,95,97
25 TWN Taiwan 89,92,96 88-96 88-97 89,92,96
26 URY Uruguay 92,95-98 88-97 88-97 92,95-97
27 USA United States 89-93,95-98 88-98 88-98 89-93,95-87
28 VEN Venezuela 92,95,97-98 88-96 88-96 92,95
29 ZAF South Africa 88,90-91,93,96-97 88-98 88-98 88,90-91,93,96-97












Bounds of Tariff Structure with Exogenous Factor PricesFigure 3
International Wage Ratios: 1980, 1995
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